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Conceptualising 
In this conceptualising chapter we will present our definition of different terms that can be 
interpreted in different ways, that we use throughout the project. 
Democracy 
During the course of this project, the concept ‘democracy’ will refer to a system of govern-
ment that serves the interest of the people regardless of their participation in political life 
(Heywood, 2007, p. 72). 
Groups 
The term ‘group’ will be used as a number of individuals with a common interest. (Olsen, 
1971, p. 8) and it implies that there is no group without its interest. (Bentley, Arthur, The 
Process of Government (Evanston, Ill.: Principia Press, 1949) p. 211; Olsen, 1971, p. 8) 
Transparency 
‘Transparency’ will refer to the ease to perceive or detect political actions and systems (Ox-
ford Dictionaries, 2013). 
Interest organisations 
For defining the concept of ‘interest organisations’, the definition of interest groups from the 
Encyclopædia Britannica will be used: a formally organised association that seeks to influ-
ence public policy (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2013). 
Lobbyism 
‘Lobbyism’ refers to an instrument used by interest organisations to gain influence on politi-
cians (Den Store Danske 1, 2013). 
Black boxes 
We will use the concept ‘black boxes’ to refer to the closed meetings between politicians and 
interest organisations. The concept is inspired from a general black box theory by Mario 
Bunge that is described in his book Philosophy of science (1963) as follows: A black box is a 
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fiction representing a set of concrete systems into which stimuli S impinge and out of which R 
emerge. The constitution and structure of the black box are altogether irrelevant to the ap-
proach under consideration, which is purely external or phenomenological (Bunge, 1963, p. 
346).  
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Abstract 
Policy making is a lengthy, legislative process, liable to be subject to various internal and ex-
ternal factors of influence, each practiced within their code of conduct. One influence often 
kept low-key is that of the interest organisation, attempting to set the agenda to the benefit of 
its members. A particularly current case of this is the case of the law of buffer zones in Den-
mark, which allowed for engaged reactions by the agricultural interest organisations. This 
project is set to examine the workings of these interest organisations, and how they practice 
lobbyism in order to further their own case via closed door meetings - a black box in the legis-
lative process. Our focus, as such, will be on the current case of buffer zones and how these 
agricultural interest organisations acquire their influence and thusly may enable themselves to 
affect legislation. We will largely acquire our empirical data through interviews with agricul-
tural interest organisation representatives and we will base our analysis on several theories 
regarding democracy, interest organisations and group theory. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page 8 of 70 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter we will firstly present certain areas of importance to the project. It is areas we 
find are lacking in transparency in the Danish democratic systems - specifically when the 
Danish government get inputs from interest organisations. After the presentation of the prob-
lem area, the chapter will culminate in the presentation of our problem formulation and the 
related working questions. 
 
Problem Area 
Agriculture takes up more than half of the total area of Denmark (MoF, 2013). The agricul-
ture sector employ 130,000 people, or 2,3% of the total population of Denmark (Den Store 
Danske 2, 2013). The total amount of export, in the area of food and agri-industrial products, 
constitutes approximately 20% of the total Danish export of goods (MoF, 2013). 
There has been a strong agricultural tradition in Denmark for a long time and the effects of 
being mainly a farming culture can be seen to this day. Especially in the 20th century, in the 
aftermath of World War II, the agricultural sector has had a defining economic significance 
for Denmark which has led to a position of significant political influence (Nissen, 2009, p. 
39). 
The Danish state had a special interest in securing the agricultural sector and its members, 
because they were in charge of a large portion of Denmark's export, which lead the state, in 
1896, to establish its first Ministry of Industry – The Department of Agriculture (Nissen, 
2009, p. 41). There arose a close cooperation between the organisations of the farming indus-
try and the state, resulting in a tradition of the agricultural organisations to have large influ-
ence on the design and implementation of agricultural policy-making in Denmark (Nissen, 
2009, p. 41). 
Due to the advance of technology, the total number of farmers has decreased. The influence of 
the European Communities, EC, (later EU) resulted in the agricultural sector losing its former 
predominance on the Danish state, especially in the 1980's where there arose an increased 
focus on the consumer and the environment. The Department of Agriculture became The 
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Ministry of Foods, Agriculture and Fisheries and is working closely with the Ministry of En-
vironment. 
The prominence of the farming community has dwindled, yet there seem to be a discrepancy 
between the importance of the agricultural sector today and the influence they still yield (Nis-
sen, 2009, p. 39). 
In 2000 the EU's Water Framework Directive establishes a framework for the protection of 
inland surface waters [...] and groundwater in all EU countries. The Directive established a 
number of environmental objectives and an overall framework for the administrative struc-
ture for planning and implementation of policies [...] (WFD, 2011 (translated from Danish)). 
In 2012, this directive essentially led the Danish government to launch a national evaluation 
of the current process of approval of pesticides as an initiative in the prevention of groundwa-
ter pollution, and it was intended to strengthen the cooperation between the authorities, busi-
nesses and organisations in order to reduce the risk of introducing dangerous pesticides to the 
groundwater (EPA 1, 2012). 
In agriculture, it is required to obtain approval for any use of biocides and pesticides (EPA 3, 
2009), though according to the Danish Government's Pesticides Strategy 2013-2015, the gov-
ernment intends to decrease the bureaucratic focus on less problematic pesticides, in order to 
better focus on the problematic ones (EPA 1, 2012). There is an on-going project to decrease 
the amount of pesticides by 40% by 2015 based on the Pesticide Load Indicator (translated 
from Danish: pesticidbelastningsindikator) (EPA 1, 2012). Particular companies that are pro-
ducing a lot of pollution are required to obtain an environmental approval in order to ensure 
that they oblige by certain environmental requirements. Larger companies are furthermore 
required to make a public account available for their standing environmental situation (EPA 2, 
2009). One of the measurements the IPM (Integrated Pest Management) has taken is the so-
called “buffer zones” (translated from Danish: “randzoner”). 
On the 1st of September 2012 the law on buffer zones came into effect in Denmark. It dic-
tated that there was to be an obligatory distance of 10 meters between cultivated land and an 
allotted type of body of water. This came as somewhat of a surprise for two large agricultural 
interest organisations in Denmark, Landbrug & Fødevarer (in English: Agriculture & Food 
Council) and Bæredygtigt Landbrug (in English: Sustainable Agriculture), as they, per tradi-
tion, were used to be consulted by government officials on major changes made to their area 
of profession. This tradition can be seen pervaded in the general practice of informal hearing 
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in the legislative process in the democratic Denmark (FIL, 2011). These interest organisations 
had in fact not been included in the forming of this law, despite their previous in involvement 
in EU’s Water Frame Directive (Appendix 3: Landbrug & Fødevarer: Niels Peter Nørring 
interview, p. 2). 
This tradition of informal hearings has the purpose of giving both the government officials 
and the different Members of the Danish Parliament (in Danish: Folketinget) a chance to let 
the voices of the people affected by a policy-in-the-making be heard. This possibility has es-
pecially been a long-standing tradition of the agricultural sector of Denmark, due to its close 
affiliation with the economy and politics of the country through history. Yet, it seems that the 
Danish agricultural sector has secured a political influence that exceeds the industry's impor-
tance to Danish society (Nissen, 2009, p. 39 (translated from Danish)). Many of these infor-
mal hearings are done behind closed doors and the Danish agricultural industry has a reputa-
tion of having the most influence compared to other industries in Denmark (Rothenborg, 
2006, p. 53). 
Governments constantly initiate laws and policies but what instances have an impact on the 
final decisions? In Denmark there is an official code of conduct on how these legislative pro-
cedures is handled, but are all voices related to the given issues heard equally loud? Is it de-
mocratic when politicians have meetings behind closed doors with no documentation? 
When we initially started researching the buffer zone law, we had a lot of discussions in the 
group about the so-called “lobbyism” and the assumed effect it has on policy-making in 
Denmark. We understood it as daily-used and accepted practice for a concept that indicate 
that there are forces applied to work on politicians and policy-making outside of the given 
system that can have an effect on the political outcome. So, who are these people, these “lob-
byists”? How do they work and why? Is it possible to observe the impact of lobbyism on a 
policy in Denmark? 
What we call lobbyism is built into the code of conduct of policy-making in Denmark. It cre-
ates “black boxes" within the code of conduct and we want to investigate these black boxes 
and portray what actually happens in them. To have a tangible case to study we have chosen 
the buffer zone case in Denmark, and whether or not the decision to implement them has been 
influenced by these agricultural lobbyists and if so, how.  
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What makes the Danish buffer zone law interesting is, that the process of its conception, 
without any inputs from the Danish interest organisations, is irregular according to the Danish 
customs. After its creation, and a change of government, the buffer zone law is now heavily 
debated, questioned and even the subject of several lawsuits by, or from the suggestion of, the 
Danish agricultural interest organisations.  
 
Problem Formulation 
This questioning leads us to present to the following problem formulation: 
How do agricultural interest organisations seek to influence the policy making process in re-
gards to the case of buffer zones in Denmark, and what general knowledge can we gain from 
policy making relating to this case? 
 
Working Questions 
And, in addition, the following preliminary working questions: 
1. What function do interest organisations have? 
2. How does lobbyism influence our views of democracy? 
3. How can we gain knowledge to what goes on in the closed meetings in the legislation 
process? 
4. What actors and institutions are involved in the policy-making process of the buffer 
zones in Denmark, and what general knowledge can we gain from their involvement? 
5. What tools do the agricultural interest organisations use to gain influence on the po-
litical actors? 
Our working questions have a chronological approach to our report. We will first introduce 
the reader to our background knowledge and specific traditions related to our case. This will 
be followed by a theory chapter. In this chapter, six theories will be presented. Each of these 
theories will represent an aspect of our problem and will be used to support discussions and 
perspectives within our analysis chapter. After the theory chapter, we will, in our methods 
chapter, explain the structure of our project and our means of collecting empirical material. 
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We will make us of the empirical material in our analysis chapter and, based on the previ-
ously presented theories, discuss the different underlying aspects and problems. The analysis 
will, as such, collect the strands of our working questions, which will be tied together in the 
conclusion as an answer to our problem formulation. Following, we will have a perspective 
chapter to reflect on what we could have done differently and other issues related to our prob-
lem.  
Beginning from the Background chapter, every time we introduce certain concepts and theo-
ries, the sections with end with a small explanation as to why this is relevant to our project. 
The above description of the structure of our project reflects our use of the so-called semi-
circular model, which allows a concurrent process of using theories and analysis. This strat-
egy will be elaborated in the methods chapter.  
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Background 
In this chapter, we will introduce the framework of information this project is based upon, in 
order to attain proper knowledge of the context. Firstly, we will present a general historical 
account of the agriculture in Denmark. Secondly, we will introduce the two agricultural inter-
est organisations referenced in this project: Landbrug & Fødevarer and Bæredygtigt Land-
brug. This will be followed by the specific notion of the buffer zone law, including the differ-
ence in approach by Landbrug & Fødevarer and Bæredygtigt Landbrug. Then we will present 
an overview of the Water Plan process. After this, we will focus on democracy as a concept, 
followed by a general explanation of the concept of an organisation. This will further lead to a 
description of interest organisations and agriculture. Finally, we will present Rothenborg’s 
Argumentation Model.  
 
Historical development 
In order to better understand the way agricultural interests act in the Danish society and in 
relation to public policy, it is relevant to look at the Danish agriculture's development 
throughout the years and what its political influence has entailed. Here we will start out with a 
brief account of agriculture's political life in Denmark throughout the 1900 and conclude with 
the recent case of EU's Water Framework Directive (WFD) which is the legislative back-
ground for the law on buffer zones. 
Agriculture has been on the agenda within the Danish government for over a century. The 
formerly named Ministry of Agriculture was formed in 1896 in order to ensure quality within 
Danish agriculture and its export, which was a prominent 75% of Denmark's total export 
(Nissen, 2009, p. 40). The Agricultural Council (in Danish: Landbrugsraadet) was established 
in 1919 to attempt to act on the political interests of the agricultural community. The organi-
sation urged for a free market, but the government was in general against such an initiative, 
due to the risk of a decrease in the quality of goods (Nissen, 2009, pp. 40-41). 
During the economic crisis of the 1930s, prices on agricultural goods decreased and the farm-
ers oppositely increased their production of goods, causing the prices to decrease even further. 
This prompted the leaders of the Agricultural Council, and its lesser affiliated organisations 
(such as the Farmers' association and the Smallholders' association), to realise that an in-
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creased agricultural control was needed in order to secure its economy (Nissen, 2009, pp. 41-
43). This crisis led to further communication between the organisations and the government. 
Still, the position of Minister of Agriculture was often possessed by a farmer, or someone 
otherwise engaged in the agricultural community. As such, the Minister of Agriculture acted 
as the direct link between the farmers and Agricultural Council on one side, and the govern-
ment on the other. Due to this close interplay between the ministry and the Agricultural 
Council, the former of the two kept primarily to the legal management, whereas the Agricul-
tural Council managed the more centralised agricultural schemes such as export and agricul-
tural goods (Nissen, 2009, pp. 41-43).   
After World War II, the Danish agricultural society changed notably, especially when Den-
mark entered the EC in 1973. The amount of full-time farms decreased and the amount of 
full-time agricultural employees went with it. This encouraged the existing farms to grow and 
become more specialized in their production. In 1960, the sizes of the Danish farms were 15.8 
ha, which 35 years later had grown to 40.7 ha. In other words, in course of time, the farms 
decreased in numbers, but those left grew in size. The individual farms specified their focus to 
one or two specific trades within agriculture. This was in great contrast to the earlier years 
where the farmers engaged in vast, general trade (Nissen, 2009, pp. 42-43). 
Denmark entering the EC was for the agricultural community an economic necessity. Their 
export had beforehand depended greatly on Great Britain. In the 1950s, Great Britain had ini-
tiated increasingly strict import customs which left the Danish agricultural economy in bad 
shape and left the farmers depended on production finance aid from the government. This 
resulted in the Agricultural Council encouraging Danish membership in the EC, hoping it 
would better the options for export. However, not all of the sub-organisations concurred. 
While the Smallholder's Association (in Danish: Husmandsforeningen) was against EC mem-
bership and held ties with the Danish Social Liberal Party (in Danish: Radikale Venstre), the 
larger Agricultural Council was able to strongly and publicly encouraged membership 
through its affiliations with the Danish Left, Liberal Party (in Danish: Venstre) as the opinion 
regarding an European partnership primarily went hand in hand with the organisations' politi-
cal alliance (Nissen, 2009, pp. 45-46). 
As Denmark gained EC membership in 1973, the Agricultural Council formed a lobby office 
in Brussels, because the agricultural politics had been centralised there, and they desired an 
on-going strong political influence. The Agricultural Council also gained membership in 
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COPA (Committee of Professional Agricultural Associations) which enabled them, along 
with other agricultural interest organisation representatives, to work on a collective position 
relating to agricultural issues, and present this to EC's appraisal. Thus they acquired a direct 
influential link to the political network in the EC (Nedergaard, et. al., 1993, pp. 50-52). 
Throughout the 1980s, the prices on agricultural goods increased less than the general prices 
and salaries, which led to a decreasing relative price over the years, due to an overproduction 
of agricultural goods within the EC, as well as an increase of salaries and other agricultural 
costs. This led the EC to introduce production quotas on certain goods and, later in the 1990s, 
environmental restrictions on arable soil to reduce the amount of unwanted chemicals in 
streams, creeks and other water lines. The EU (as per 1993) furthermore introduced restric-
tions on the amount of livestock compared to the size of the farm's arable land.  
Finally, the general focus of the EU had shifted to a clear environmental angle and the agri-
cultural support from the aforementioned political parties dwindled with the increase in ur-
banisation. Furthermore, the previous affiliation between the Agricultural Council and the 
Ministry of Agriculture in Denmark became practically non-existent with the increased gov-
ernmental focus on environmental concerns. The farming community in Denmark initially 
attempted to ward off these legislations with counter arguments and scientific claims (Nissen, 
2009, pp. 46-48). Despite the fact that the close interplay between the Agricultural Council 
and the Ministry of Agriculture in Denmark had ceased to exist, primary means of gaining 
influence beneficial to the farmer's interests was still seen in informal meetings with various 
political parties and, still, the Minister of Agriculture (Hansen, 1994, pp. 172-173). 
The Danish population voted against membership of the EU in 1992 which caused the Agri-
cultural Council to present claims that the rejection would have damaging consequences on 
unemployment and export opportunities within the farming community. As such, the Agricul-
tural Council succeeded in pressuring the government to address the issues related to the EU, 
and also to put pressure on the Danish population to vote for membership of the EU in a new 
referendum (Nissen, 2009, p. 48). With the Danish membership of EU in 1993, the agricul-
tural interest organisations continued to practice their direct influence through COPA and, 
more indirectly, through Danish political actors in more informal settings (Hansen, 1994, p. 
173). 
With the turn of the century, the farming communities in Denmark remain on the receiving 
end of notable financial aid from EU (Nissen, 2009, p. 49) and is often considered to have 
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some of the most powerful political influence in Denmark (Hansen, 1994, pp. 174-175). This 
is despite the clear decrease in number of farms and, oppositely, the growing size of the re-
maining ones. Furthermore, the Agricultural Council (as of 2009 a part of Landbrug & 
Fødevarer) expressed a continuous interest in maintaining a healthy environment and further 
appears with a co-operative image (Nissen, 2009, p. 49). 
EU's Water Framework Directive (WFD) was first adopted in 2000 with the intention to pro-
vide environmental protection to future water resources (European Commission, 2010). The 
status reports made by the WFD in 2007 and 2012 started the current debate of buffer zones 
between the government on one hand, and the political opposition and agricultural interest 
organisations on the other. The former Agricultural Council, now Landbrug & Fødevarer, and 
Bæredygtig Landbrug are the primary representatives of the agricultural community. Yet, 
despite their common interests, the two organisations claim to have different ways of gaining 
influence and practicing their interests. 
There has been a notable change throughout the years of the agricultural sector and its politi-
cal activity in Denmark. In the former half of the 1900, the farming communities existed as a 
primary source of economic progress, with clear support from certain political parties and 
direct interplay with ministries of relevance. Over the years, migration from countryside to 
the big cities in Denmark resulted in farming as a profession decreasing in national impor-
tance. But the Danish farmers has continuously been able to adapt and obtain the necessary 
tools to best get their interests across and obtain the attention of influential decision makers. 
 
Landbrug & Fødevarer 
The Danish agricultural organisation Landbrug & Fødevarer [...] represents the farming and 
food industries of Denmark including businesses, trade and farmers’ associations (L&F1, 
2013) and promotes the political influence of the agricultural sector (L&F1, 2013). Landbrug 
& Fødevarer was established in 2009 and is a fusion between the Agricultural Council (Land-
brugsraadet), Danish Slaughterhouses (in Danish: Danske Slagterier), Danish Pig Production 
(in Danish: Dansk Svineproduktion), Danish Agriculture (in Danish: Dansk Landbrug) and 
other organisations within the agricultural sector (L&F1, 2013). 
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Landbrug & Fødevarer has sued the government twice: On the 31st of may 2012, Landbrug & 
Fødevarer sued the government, specifically the Ministry of Environment, regarding the Wa-
ter Plans of 2011, concerning, among other things, how the Water Framework Directive 
(WFD) was implemented (L&F2, 2013). 
On the 12th of October 2012, Landbrug & Fødevarer sued the government, specifically the 
Ministry of Food, Agriculture & Fisheries and the Ministry of Environment. This lawsuit re-
lates to the overall effect of the initiatives launched in regards to the Green Growth (in Dan-
ish: Grøn Vækst) package, specifically the buffer zone law, the requirements of the after-
crops and the modified watercourse maintenance. Landbrug & Fødevarer believes that both 
separately and put together, these actions constitute expropriation in breach of the Constitu-
tion § 73
1
. Landbrug & Fødevarer believes that the interventions did not happen in the public 
interest and were not necessary, and if the court of law would accept the initiatives, the mem-
bers of Landbrug & Fødevarer must receive full compensation (L&F2, 2013). 
 
Bæredygtigt Landbrug 
Bæredygtigt Landbrug is an interest organisation started in 2010 with the purpose of increas-
ing the profit of agricultural businesses in Denmark, by pointing out absurdities and limita-
tions in the production through professional and objective argumentation. Today they have a 
total of approximately 4100 members from the agricultural industry, who, in total, is respon-
sible for around 50% of the Danish food production. Since Bæredygtigt Landbrug started, the 
organisation has had three cases: The Water Plan-case, the fertilizer-case, and now the buffer 
zone-case (BL1, 2013). 
The goals of Bæredygtigt Landbrug are to abolish the economically straining part of Green 
Growth, to secure the members against new interventions, and to eliminate taxes and fees that 
place a strain on the agricultural economy compared to competitors (BL2, 2013). 
Bæredygtigt Landbrug sued the Ministry of Food Agriculture and Fisheries on 8 February 
2013, with the requirement that the buffer zone law abolished. They believe the buffer zone 
law will end up costing Danish agriculture 7.7 billion Danish kroner. Head of Bæredygtigt 
                                                 
1 Expropriation means coercive takeover of private property by the government. To protect against such viola-
tions, § 73 of the Danish constitution 1) gives full compensation of the area taken over, 2) it is only allowed with 
regards to the common good and 3) it must authorised by law (Den Store Danske 3, 2013). 
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Landbrug, Vang Lundsteen explains: The individual farmer will with buffer zones get  large 
parts of their land expropriated [...] the area forced out of production, and the farmer loses 
the opportunity to grow as he wants and make profit of that area. I know of no other business 
that will stand that the state reduces their revenue base by up to five percent, just like that 
(BL1, 2013). 
 
The Buffer Zone Law 
The Danish buffer zone law states, that for all the watercourses in rural areas, and for lakes 
with a surface area of over 100 m2 in rural areas, a 10 meter buffer zone must be established. 
This area must not be fertilized, sprayed, cultivated or other tillage, with the exception of ar-
eas with forestry, gardening, and parks (Appendix 5: The buffer zone law, pp. 1-2). This cor-
responds to an area of 50.000ha (L&F3, 2013). As such, the total area at disposal to the 
farmer is reduced, resulting in e.g. a reduction of livestock (L&F5, 2012, p. 18). Furthermore, 
the 10 meter buffer zone is open to the public, as long as the buffer zone is located where it 
can be accessed without intruding private property (L&F4, 2013). 
The buffer zone case: Bæredygtigt Landbrug vs. Landbrug & Fødevarer 
Bæredygtigt Landbrug (BL)… Landbrug & Fødevarer (L&F)… 
Has sued on behalf of their members. This means that 
every member of BL is part of the trial, and the result 
will apply to all members as well. 
Has sued on behalf of five members. The 
remaining members are recommended to 
have their own lawyer assess whether they 
should sue. L&F hope that the result of this 
case can be serve as an example for the re-
maining farmers, thereby achieving the same 
result as the five in the lawsuit. 
Claim that the buffer zone law is invalid, in part be-
cause it is expropriation, and in part because it is not 
in line with EU’s Water Framework Directive (mean-
ing it is wrongful executions). The lawsuit specifi-
cally 'attacks' the buffer zones (not cover crops and 
maintenance of watercourses), and does so from two 
angles, respectively as illegal expropriation according 
Claim that the combined effects of the buffer 
zones, cover crops and different maintenance 
of the watercourses are expropriation. 
The lawsuit 'attacks' the combined effect of 
the mentioned initiatives as illegal expropria-
tion according to the constitution and the 
rules of the EU (though with the possibility 
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to the constitution and the rules of the EU, but also as 
illegal, wrongful executions of the EU directive. 
of one of the initiatives being illegal expro-
priation by itself). There are no claims of 
wrongful execution. 
Along and their lawyer, consider the possibility of 
achieving delaying effects surrounding the enforce-
ment of the buffer zones. 
Rule out the possibility of achieving delaying 
effects surrounding the enforcement of the 
buffer zones. 
Believes it is a case of illegal expropriation, since 
they deem the initiatives involving the buffer zones 
unnecessary because the farmers have not been fully 
compensated. 
Believes it is a case of illegal expropriation, 
since they deem the initiatives involving the 
buffer zones etc. unnecessary because the 
farmers have not been fully compensated. 
No request for an expert's report Have requested an expert’s report in the case, 
which means an inspection of the specific 
initiatives, must take place and an impartial 
expert has to answer a series of questions 
stipulated by the two parties in the cases. 
Describe the general effects of buffer zones in Danish 
agriculture i.e. consequences of operation, environ-
ment and economy. 
Describe the specific effects of buffer zones 
etc. for each of the five farmers in the lawsuit 
i.e. consequences of operation, environment 
and economy. 
(BL3, 2013 (translated from Danish)) 
 
The process of the Water Plans 
03-10.12.2011: As there had been made changes to the original Water Plan, a supplementary 
hearing was held by the Danish Nature Agency (in Danish: Naturstyrelsen, under Miljøminis-
teriet). 
08.11.2012: The agricultural district (in Danish: landbrugsdistriktet) submits small adjust-
ments for the Water Plans to the committee. 
06.12.2012: The Complaints Board of Nature and Environment (in Danish: Natur- og Miljøk-
lagenævnet) has subsequently decided that the supplementary hearing on the 03-10.12.2011 
was too short, and therefore the Water Plans were declared invalid. 
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26.02.2013: New Water Plans must be valid in 2013 for the compensation to be in order. 
08.05.2013: The modified Water Plans are put in hearing for six months by the acting Minis-
ter of Environment Pia Olsen Dyhr. As such, the new Water Plans cannot be validated by 
2013. 
 
 
Democracy 
Defining democracy 
The term democracy derives from the ancient Greek ‘demos’ meaning the people or the many 
and ‘kratos’ meaning rule or power. An essential principle of democracy is that political 
power should be distributed as equally and widely as possible. Though certain restrictions are 
still necessary, e.g. in the form of age, gender, mental health, and so on. However, the restric-
tions on official voting limitations are not as pronounced today as they were when the tradi-
tion first arrived. Strictness and nature of restrictions do vary from country to country, and the 
option of political participation or right thereof, does still in some places, exclude people from 
political participation on basis of e.g. gender, status/income, and race. In the case of Denmark, 
people over the age of 18, with exception of the certifiably insane, have the right to vote and 
participate in political affairs, if they wish. (Heywood, 2007, pp. 72-73) 
Denmark has what is called a representative democracy, which is a limited and indirect form 
of democracy. It is limited in the sense that […] popular participation in government is infre-
quent and brief, being restricted to the act of voting every few years [...] (Heywood, 2007, p. 
74) and restricted in the sense that the public does not exercise political power themselves, but 
rather, by voting, choose representatives to rule on their behalf. Where direct democracy 
might be viewed as the optimal type of democracy, representative democracy offers a much 
more manageable and easier-in-praxis democracy for larger communities (Heywood, 2007, p. 
74). 
Measuring democracy 
There are different levels or states of democracy. The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) has 
developed a method of measuring the state of a country’s democracy, and has since 2006 pro-
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duced five Democracy Index reports. In these reports the EIU measure democracy in 167 
countries, 165 independent states and two territories, rank them according to score, and com-
pare score to previous years. They measure the state of democracy by asking mostly experts, 
but also public opinion, 60 questions with a couple of choices for answers. The 60 questions 
are grouped in five categories: electoral process and pluralism, civil liberties, the functioning 
of government, political participation, and political culture. Ultimately, the score will place 
the countries in one of four categories: full democracies, flawed democracies, hybrid regimes, 
and authoritarian regimes. In the EIU Democracy Index report from 2012, Norway is ranked 
number one and is thereby considered to have full democracy and in the very bottom, ranked 
167, is North Korea with an authoritarian regime. Denmark also has full democracy and is 
ranked number four (Appendix 1: EIU Democracy Index Report, 2013). 
Why is this relevant to our project? It can give us a picture of how democratic Denmark is 
considered to be compared to other countries. Defining democracy, and the way it is meas-
ured, can help us gain knowledge of transparency or lack thereof. We can, furthermore, use 
this background in our reflections concerning the existing black boxes and the lack of democ-
racy these may or may not pose.  
 
What is an organisation? 
In order to understand interest organisations, it is important to understand what an organisa-
tion is. 
The purpose of an organisation can be characterised as [...] the furtherance of the interests of 
their members (Olsen, 1971, p. 5). As Aristotle expressed it: Men journey together with a 
view to particular advantage, and by way of providing some particular thing needed for the 
purposes of life, and similarly the political association seems to have come together origi-
nally, and to continue in existence, for the sake of the general advantages it brings (Ethics 
VIII.9.1160a; Olsen, 1971, p. 6). Expressed differently; actors join together in organisations 
with a common interest in order to fulfil these interest. The advance of the common interest is 
the organisations’ [...] characteristic and primary function (Olsen, 1971, p. 7). 
An organisation is expected to further the interest of its members e.g. Farm organisations are 
expected to strive for favourable legislation for their members (Olsen, 1971, p. 6). If an or-
ganisation fails to do so, it is expected of its members to object, forcing the organisation to 
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adjust its priorities. If unsuccessful, it can result in loss of membership in the organisation, 
and the emerging of new organisations (Olsen, 1971, p. 6).  
 
Interest organisations and the relation to agriculture 
Interest organisations generally collect its members within a narrower category of interest 
than a political party (Ronit, 1998, p. 7) and […] confine their activities to the concerns of 
their members […] (Wilson, 1977, pp. 80-81). In the case of agriculture, we see a historically 
important trade, which now only employ a small part of the population. Still, the organisa-
tions representing agriculture are influential and powerful, as seen in Denmark where there is 
a […] strong tradition of organisations directly involved in all stages of the political and ad-
ministrative decision-making process […] (Buksti, 1984, p. 16 (translated from Danish)) 
which originates from before the government started regulating in those areas (Buksti, 1984, 
p. 16). 
In relation to what makes an interest organisation powerful the case of the dominant British 
agricultural interest organisation NFU (National Farmers’ Union) can be used. Its power 
originates from its recruitment of members, the absence of rivalling organisations and its 
close relationship with the Government Department (Wilson, 1977, p. 30). This can also be 
called the resources of the organisations, which also entails representativeness, economic 
strength, expertise within the field of interest and the administrative capacity (Buksti, 1984, p. 
18). 
Wilson expresses his admiration for the success achieved by the NFU, as it has [succeeded] in 
organizing an industry renowned for individualism and characterized by geographical isola-
tion (Wilson, 1977, p. 31). In addition to that, Wilson argues that agriculture is a difficult in-
dustry to govern, as it consists of small units of singular farms, and the skill of the individual 
farmer varies, as does the quality of the soil, compared to a more homogeneous trade such as 
production or factories, which are less vulnerable to individual expertise (Wilson, 1977, p. 1). 
Due to […] the technical revolution in agriculture […] many farmers faced low or even de-
creasing marginal costs of production (Wilson, 1977, p. 2). Wilson goes on, saying: Under 
free market conditions with farmers behaving like rational economic men, an automatic re-
duction in the numbers of farms would result from the comparatively low wages and profits in 
agriculture (Wilson, 1977, p. 2), as such creating a trend where low-profit farms would be 
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sold to high-profit farms, until farm incomes were once more comparable to those enjoyed in 
other sectors (Wilson, 1977, p. 2). One reason as to why this has not happened is that farmers 
do not behave as rational economic men. Wilson takes note of how farmers tend to have emo-
tional ties with their land and the feeling of independence, and are, as such, not willing to give 
up their livelihood (Wilson, 1977, p. 2). 
In addition to that, there are the agricultural subsidies. Instead of […] helping farmers shift 
into different, more profitable occupations (Wilson, 1977, p. 2), governments attempt […] to 
maintain farm prices and incomes at some level justified either by history or by comparisons 
with the rest of the economy (Wilson, 1977, p. 2), and by doing this, the government is direct-
ing massive amounts of money into an industry defined as low-profitable by economists (Wil-
son, 1977, p. 3). Therefore, agricultural subsidies defy the ‘laws’ of comparative advantage 
(Wilson, 1977, p. 3) and Wilson concludes that […] more valuable production […] could 
have been achieved by investing the same amount of money elsewhere (Wilson, 1977, p. 4). 
With these arguments against subsidies, one can reflect upon why the subsidies are not re-
moved. As already mentioned, the historical importance of the industry has created a protec-
tive environment, but what is most relevant in this context, is that of agricultural interest or-
ganisations. In the United States some agricultural interest organisations, such as the Ameri-
can Farm Bureau Federation (AFBF) and the Farmers' Educational and Cooperative Union of 
America (NFU - not to be confused with the British organisation of the same abridgment), are 
capable of persuading like-minded congressmen to vote in correlation with the opinions of the 
organisations(Wilson, 1977, p. 8). Furthermore, the organisations hold a political power in 
regards to elections, where they can […] punish enemies and reward friends through cam-
paign contributions […] (Wilson, 1977, p. 8). It can therefore be difficult to make changes in 
the agricultural legislation, as […] either Congress, the Executive, or both, [can be] unwilling 
to offend these powerful organized interests […] (Wilson, 1977, p. 75).  
In Denmark, the situation is not the same, but similarities can be drawn. As in the United 
States, the interest organisations provide parliamentary politicians with information, with the 
objective of changing the agenda. Regarding financial support, the law on private contribu-
tions to political parties states that contributions exceeding the amount of 20.000 Danish 
kroner and that, the benefactor's name and address must appear in the accounts (Appendix 6: 
Law on private contributions to political parties, §3, stk. 2), but the amount contributed is not 
required to be revealed. If the donation is anonymous, and the amount exceeds the 20.000kr, 
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the actual amount must be declared (Appendix 6: Law on private contributions to political 
parties, §3, stk. 2). The account of a political party must be submitted to the Danish Parlia-
ment and the Danish Parliament will afterwards present the account for public inspection 
(Appendix 6: Law on private contributions to political parties, §5). An analysis made by the 
Danish labour union HK/Danmark questions this law, as it finds that [...] the legislation has 
not provided a situation where the political parties can compete equally in financial terms. 
The private contributions have created and are still creating inequality (Bille, 2004, p. 52). 
Why is this relevant to our project? This gives us insight into what makes an interest organisa-
tion powerful and how farmers, organisations, and government interact with each other and 
the reasoning behind their decision-making. 
 
Rothenborg’s Argumentation model 
In 2006, the Danish journalist Michael Rothenborg wrote a book called In Conflict With Na-
ture (in Danish: I Strid Med Naturen) that deals with the Danish agricultural sector's conges-
tion of the Danish environment. He argues that the pollution by the agricultural sector in 
Denmark has gotten to a point where you cannot make new environmental preservation legis-
lations, without hurting the growth and economy in Denmark. Rothenborg explains that it is 
due to the farming community's excellent ability to navigate in the Danish political landscape, 
and its long tradition of strong political figures that the matter has gotten to this point, as can 
be seen in the following quote: 
The Danish agricultural sector has a strong representation in politics. The industry's people 
are well versed in playing on the feelings of their own and Denmark's economy, the farming 
traditions and the uncertainties between experts. And they have halted many attempts to 
tighten environmental regulations (Rothenborg 2006, p. 51 (translated from Danish)). 
Rothenborg also presents a standard model of rejection of new more strict environmental re-
quirements by the agricultural sector in Denmark. A model, he claims, they have had a lot of 
success with and still use to this day. It goes as follows: 
1. There is no problem. 
2. If there is a problem, it is not our fault. 
3. If it is our fault, we cannot do anything about it. 
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4. If we have to do something about it, we require compensation.      
 
In Rothenborg's book, Professor Emeritus of Urban Water Engineering at the Danish Techni-
cal University, Mogens Henze, also marvels at the fact that the Danish agricultural sector has 
been able to secure compensation for stopping their pollution. 
 [...] The main principle of Danish and International policy have always been that the 
 polluter pays and the industry companies never got compensation when they were re-
 quired to reduce their pollution. [...] Still the agricultural sector managed to secure 
 compensation. That is truly skilful, says Henze (Rothenborg 2006, p. 56-57 (translated 
 from Danish)). 
Rothenborg gives several examples on how the agricultural sector in Denmark argues for how 
they are responsible for large portions of the Danish economy. An example of this is how the 
farming community claimed that they secured 37 billion kroner. out of the 54,6 billion kroner 
profit Denmark made in 2005. Yet, the Danish Society for Nature Conservation (in Danish: 
Danmarks Naturfredningsforening) concluded in the same year that only 8% of the value 
creation in Denmark was contributed from the farming community (Rothenborg, 2006, p. 63). 
Arguably, profit and value creation is two different things, but it can be an indicator of where 
the agricultural sector in Denmark has its focus. 
Why is this relevant to our project? Rothenborg’s book explains how the Danish agricultural 
sector exercises its influence and gives a critical view on the some of the overall methods they 
use. 
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Theory 
In this chapter, we will introduce 6 different theories. Each of these theories will support vari-
ous aspects of our problem, with different perspectives and approaches. Firstly, we will pre-
sent the general comprehension of the Danish Legislative Process. Secondly, we will explain 
the By-Product theory by Mancur Olsen. Then we will first explain the Pluralist Model, which 
will be followed by the countering theory of the Corporatist Model. Then we will proceed 
with the theory of Pressure Groups by John R. Commons, followed by John Friedmann’s 
planning theory of Policy Analysis. We will end this chapter with a final summary of the en-
tire chapter in order to put the theories into context.  
 
Danish Legislative Process 
The need for new legislation can originate from different parts of society. It can be a result of 
an idea, a change in society, a reform, a need to modernise an old law, a wish to solve a con-
crete problem, a result of EU directives, etc. When the need for a new law is established, ei-
ther the government officials or the opposition officials will prepare drafts of the bill. When 
the bill is completed, the minister will approve it and must, as a minimum requirement, send it 
to a hearing in the Ministry of Justice’s legislative office. In addition to that, the Ministry of 
Finance and the Prime Minister's Department must be notified. Along with these mandatory 
hearings, the bill may be sent to a variety of different partners and interest organisations de-
pending on the type of bill and whom it affects. The bill will at this point be uploaded to the 
relevant ministry’s official webpage. Feedback from the hearings can include suggestions of a 
technical nature (such as layout and phrasing) as well as suggestions for actual changes of 
contents. This feedback will be sent by the minister to the department of the Danish Parlia-
ment that the bill belongs to, where the bill might be changed in accordance to the suggestions 
of the feedback. 
Before being presented to the Danish Parliament, the bill must pass through a hearing by the 
governments’ political spokesmen, the governments’ coordination committee and a ministe-
rial conference. When the bill is presented to the Danish Parliament, it occurs in two stages. 
At the “first process”, the spokesmen from the Danish Parliament comment on the bill, but 
both the spokesmen from the Danish Parliament and the minister have the opportunity to take 
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the floor several times. This entire process is broadcasted on TV and is additionally available 
on the internet. This can go on for many hours, but if the bill has a strong support, the process 
will move somewhat faster, and finally it is sent to debate in committee, where the member of 
the committee can ask the minister questions or chose to call the minister in to a consultation. 
This part of the process will result in a report about the bill from the members of the commit-
tee. 
At the “second process”, the bill is discussed again, questions are asked and ultimately the 
Danish Parliament votes on the possible changes. If there are no new proposed amendments, 
the “third process” entails that the complete bill will be sent the general vote. If the bill is 
passed, the queen of Denmark must approve the bill at the council of state and allow it to be 
presented. As a very last step, the bill receives the Royal Assent by the Queen; otherwise the 
law cannot take effect. What is left is to choose a date for when the law becomes binding 
(MoE, 2013). 
Now the bill is ready to be presented. The chairman of the Danish Parliament announces the 
minister who wishes to present it. This must happen no later than 30 days before they wish for 
the law to take effect.  
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Figure 1: The Danish Legislative Process (samfundsfag.dk, 2013) 
Why is this relevant to our project? It gives an overview of how the Danish legislative process 
works and helps us to pinpoint where interest organisations fit in.  
 
Mancur Olsen: The “By-Product” Theory 
In the book The Logic of Collective Action, the economist and social scientist Mancur Olsen 
argues that there has been an understanding [...] that groups act to serve their interests pre-
sumably [which is] based on the assumption that the individuals in groups act out of self-
interest (Olsen, 1971, p. 1). Put differently, if there is a common objective in the group, which 
would benefit all, it is assumed that the members of the group, [...] if they were rational and 
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self-interested (Olsen, 1971, p. 1) would strive to achieve this common objective. This argu-
ment, Olsen argues, is not true. Olsen found that [...] rational self-interested individuals will 
not act to achieve their common or group interests (Olsen, 1971, p. 2) unless there is some 
sort of force compelling them to do so, or if there is offered a type of benefit, different from 
what the common goal of the group is. If this has not been realised, the rational self-interested 
individual will not strive for a common good. 
The “By-Product” theory explains how there exists large organised groups despite how, as 
explained above, the individuals in such groups have no motivation [...] to organise a lobby 
or to obtain a collective benefit (Olsen, 1971, p. 132). Olsen asserts that there is a common 
characteristic among the large organised economic groups, which separates them from those 
groups that are not organised. This common characteristic [...] is that these groups are also 
organised for some other purpose. The large and powerful economic lobbies are in fact the 
by-products of organisations that obtain their strength and support because they perform 
some function in addition to lobbying for collective goods (Olsen, 1971, p. 132). As such, 
according to this theory, when there are interest organisations that are strong and influential, 
the lobbyism part of the organisation is rather a tool, but not the goal of the organisation. To 
summarise; the “By-Product” theory claims that the power of the large interest organisations 
does not derive from the lobbyism conducted by the organisation, but rather that it is a by-
product of the organisation’s other activities (Olsen, 1971, p. 3). 
Why is this relevant to our project? As this project examines the influence and power of the 
Danish agricultural interest organisations, this theory can offer an explanation to some of our 
issues, e.g. how the interest organisations organise and distribute their resources. 
 
Pluralist model 
There are many ways of viewing interest groups and their function in society and the political 
life. On one hand, one can consider interest organisations and pressure groups beneficial to 
the processes of policy making and society in general, which is greatly supported by the po-
litical tradition of “pluralism”, though pluralism does not only encompass interest groups and 
their behaviour. Pluralism as a political philosophy insists that all organisations within the 
private sector should be allowed to play an essential part within society (Olsen, 1971, p. 111). 
The pluralist model of interest group politics further encourages the communication between 
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interest group and government actors, and argues that it allows the promotion of the democ-
ratic process. This statement is based on the following assumptions: 
 [...] that all groups and interests have the potential to organize and gain access to gov-
 ernment, that they are internally responsive in the sense that leaders broadly articulate 
 the interests or values of their members, and that their political influence is roughly in 
 line with their size and the intensity of their support (Heywood, 2007. p. 298). 
Olsen states that pluralism [...] emphasises the spontaneity, the liberty, and the voluntary 
quality of the private association in contrast with the compulsory, coercive character of the 
state (Olsen, 1971, p. 112). Heywood further supports this theory with the indication that all 
groups are capable of being heard within the processes of policy making, and that this com-
plements the representative democratic process (Heywood, 2007. p. 300). From this, you can 
consider that the tradition of pluralism and the pluralist model offer a complimentary envi-
ronment for interest organisations. Pluralism compels interest organisations to take political 
action and engage in interactions with the state.  
Why is this theory relevant to our project? This is interesting to consider as we will be able to 
discuss the influence interest organisations have on decision making, and what problems this 
aspect may or may not pose, particularly relating to democratic tendencies.  
 
Corporatist model 
Contrary to the theory of the pluralist model, Heywood presents the corporatist model, which 
argues that certain group's relation to the government is a privilege as it enables [...] them to 
influence the formulation and implementation of public policy (Heywood, 2007. p. 299). It 
stresses this privilege with the formal ties between government and interest organisation, and 
further suggests that this is a matter of interdependent relationship. On one hand, interest 
groups aim for these bonds with the government for better access to decision making, in order 
to better perform as is beneficial to their interests. On the other hand, the government seeks 
groups [...] as a source of knowledge and information, and because the compliance of major 
interests is essential if policy is to be workable (Heywood, 2007. p. 299). Unlike pluralism, 
the corporatist model furthermore indicates that these groups are [...] hierarchically ordered 
and dominated by leaders who are not directly accountable to members (Heywood, 2007. p. 
300). The corporatist model additionally suggests that the relationship and bargaining be-
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tween interest group and government is [...] in no way subject to public scrutiny (Heywood, 
2007. p. 300) and that it as such poses a threat to representative democracy. 
Why is this relevant to our project? This shows the mutually beneficial relationship between 
politicians and interest organisations and the potential for lack of transparency. 
 
John R. Commons: The Pressure Group 
The institutional economist John R. Commons was a strong support for the pressure group, as 
he believed that [...] pressure groups were the most representative and beneficial forces af-
fecting American economic policy (Olsen, 1971, p. 115). Commons based this view upon how 
he found that the way the system worked, especially the market mechanisms, […] did not for 
themselves bring about fair results to the different groups in the economy (Olsen, 1971, p. 
115). The disparity of the market mechanisms would not be corrected by the mechanisms of 
government, unless the pressure groups were able to coerce through the necessary actions 
(Olsen, 1971, p. 115). This, Commons argues for, was due to how “machine” politicians and 
men with enough wealth to buy influence, control the legislatures (Olsen, 1971, p. 115). As 
such, Commons argues that [...] pressure groups were [...] virtually an indispensable means 
for the achievement of a just and rational economic order (Commons, Economics of Collec-
tive Action, passim, esp. pp. 33, 59, 262-291; Institutional Economics, passim; Olsen, 1971, 
p. 115). For that reason, Commons suggests that the pressure groups, especially the farm or-
ganisations among others, [is] the most vital institutions in society and the lifeblood of democ-
racy (Olsen, 1971, p. 116). 
Why is this relevant to our project? Commons represents a view that pressure groups are a 
vital part of the society and represents the very lifeblood of democracy, as he found that the 
legislative and political process was insufficient. This is relevant to our project as we discuss 
the democratic value of interest organisations in the Danish society. 
 
John Friedmann: Planning Theory - Policy Analysis 
An established understanding of aspects within decision making is needed, when we examine 
the influence interest organisations have on government policy making. Policy analysis is a 
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relatively young strategy with origin in the late 1960s. Professor of Planning, John Friedmann 
discusses it as a procedure which [...] promised to become the gyroscope that would help us 
keep us on a steady course (Friedmann, 1987, p. 137), referring to accomplishments and so-
cietal guidance within a nation. He highlights three branches of academic traditions practices 
which he argues shaped the field of policy analysis: systems engineering, management sci-
ence and, finally, political and administrative sciences. The merging of these three branches 
was supported by the general ideal to have scientific methods make for rational policy deci-
sions and, further, that these rational policy decisions would strengthen [...] problem-solving 
abilities of organizations (Friedmann, 1987, pp. 137-139). 
Friedmann indicates the lack of attention this profession brought to the specific field of inter-
est in the early days of the emergence of the policy analysts. He argues that the effectiveness 
of an analyst depends on their [...] knowledge of the historical and institutional context for 
decision (Friedmann, 1987, p. 143). With this in mind, you could consider the need for spe-
cialised analysts within their subject of decision planning, for a competent and focused analy-
sis area of expertise. However, Friedmann also argues for the universal problem-solving abili-
ties and flexibility found in analysts, quoting Wildavsky in order to emphasise [...] analysis, 
not subject matter. This further stresses that a universal understanding of policy analysis is 
found in systems (Friedmann, 1987, p. 143). From this, you could derive a need for profes-
sionals with a distinctive understanding of the field of analysis, with a lesser, albeit present, 
insight into the specific area subject to decision. 
Upon reflection, the methods and concepts of policy analysis can be subject to critique. 
Friedmann interprets essays by Rittel and Weber, where they discuss the nature of problems 
and the contrasting "benign" and "wicked" problems, with particular focus on the latter. "Be-
nign" or "tame" problems are defined as a problem with a clear aim and a clear estimation of 
whether or not the problem has been solved. Alternatively, they present the so-called 
"wicked" problems, which represent problems tricky in nature, with no immediate solution. 
They explain that "wicked" problems encompass all social issues and, further, that [...] social 
problems are never solved; they are merely displaced by other problems (Friedmann, 1987, 
pp. 165-167). In relation to this, Friedmann puts light on "the veil of time": the desire to fore-
cast future occurrences, as is popular in any science. He argues that this tradition of forecast-
ing is improbable to hold much merit as actual and certain predictions, although it can be use-
ful as a tool in various situations, e.g. awareness of a coming crisis (Friedmann, 1987, pp. 
168-170). 
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Why is this theory relevant to our project? The theory of policy analysis will help us explain 
how decision making is conducted. It will, furthermore, address the problems that may arise 
during decision making. This is relevant because our project concerns a specific case of pol-
icy making, the buffer zones in Denmark, and we will from this be able to explain underlying 
aspects to this process. 
 
Summary 
In this summary we will explain the connection between our numerous theories. The theory 
on the Danish Legislative Process and the Corporatist Model are connected as they deal with 
the legislative system and how the various actors interact. An additional connection is the 
Pluralist Model, which encourages the communication between interest group and govern-
ment actors. The Pluralist Model is furthermore interlinked with the theory on pressure groups 
made by Commons in their agreement on the positive effect pressure groups, or interest or-
ganisations, have on society. On the subject of interest organisation, the “By-Product” theory 
by Olsen connects to all the above mentioned theories, as it gives an explanation to the struc-
ture of the interest organisation. 
The Policy Analysis theory by Friedmann is well linked with the theory on the Danish Legis-
lative Process and the Corporatist Model, as it deals with understanding aspects within deci-
sion making and the problems that may arise during this. 
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Methods 
In this chapter, we will present our considerations in relation to the methodology of this pro-
ject report. Firstly, we will give an account of our theoretical framework and the use of quali-
tative research therein. Secondly, we will describe and reflect upon our means of collecting 
knowledge. Thirdly, we will discuss our analytical strategy and the structure of our project. 
Lastly, we will offer some thought to limitations.   
As 2
nd
 semester students our theoretical framework was essentially given to us because of 
RUC's study bylaws assert that our semester project has to be a interdisciplinary between at 
least two of the four subjects we have had so far (Political Science, Sociology, Economics and 
Planning, Space and Resources). The interdisciplinarity offers an array of interesting topics to 
choose between. In our case, we aim to focus on Political Science and Planning, Space and 
Resources. In addition, we adopt aspects of Sociology due to its strong affiliations with quali-
tative methods. Arguably this could be seen as an impediment of the choice of research, but in 
our own project group it was only perceived as a helpful guide to what theories to choose, 
after we had chosen our area of research. 
As opposed to quantitative research with a focus on statistics as well as numerical data and 
presentations, qualitative data engages in studies more subjective in nature. You can break 
this down into four essential features: [...] the correct choice of appropriate methods and 
theories; the recognition and analysis of different perspectives; the researchers' reflections on 
their research as part of the process of knowledge production; and the variety of approaches 
and methods (Flick, 2009. p. 14). With the focus on key terms such as 'different perspectives', 
'reflections' and 'variety of approaches', you can argue that qualitative research focuses in es-
sence on subjective tendencies. All of these features furthermore depend on your specific 
study in question. 
We chose to focus on a single case (the case of buffer zones in Denmark) because of several 
factors: 1) It had many different actors (political parties, ministers, interest groups, NGO's) 
involved. 2) These actors (forces) are easily identified and 3) many different kinds of empiri-
cal data are available, depending on the methodological approach we choose. The case of 
buffer zones furthermore opens up for new knowledge to examine through venues of these 
different actors and the empirical data available; an aspect we consider very interesting. 
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Empirical study 
In this section, we will introduce our considerations relating to the collection of our empirical 
material. We will in particular discuss how we can obtain knowledge of the meetings behind 
closed doors within the legislation process. Firstly, we will present the use of interviews in 
our research. Here there will also be an introduction of the two interviewees. Secondly, we 
will explain what role observation has played. Finally, we will offer some alternatives that 
could have been valid and reflect on why we chose not to include these options. Later, we will 
reflect on and discuss these points in our analysis, in order to tie them together and answer our 
third working question in our final conclusion. 
Interviews 
As a starting point we want to identify the different forces' (with a focus on non-government 
interests) influence and how this influence has shaped the finished policy the buffer zones. By 
clarifying this, we established that getting interviews with the relevant actors would be the 
best approach to get primary data, because it could give us unique insight into the workings of 
closed meetings between interest organisations and politicians in relation to the case. 
We want to use these interviews to investigate how these interest organisations work, whether 
or not they have influence, and perhaps even what their function is in the Danish democracy. 
We will research the conditions and consequences of having interest organisations in a de-
mocratic system as a whole, and in the buffer zone legislation process specifically. 
For the scheduled interviews we prepared pre-designed interview schemas with room for im-
provisation. The intention with this procedure is to get the interviewees' view on the processes 
and compare them to the official policy-making procedures. We chose an interview with a 
representative from each of the two major Danish agricultural interest organisations: Land-
brug & Fødevarer and Bæredygtigt Landbrug. Both of these interest organisations are active 
within our case of study and both will be further introduced later in this report. With these 
actors in mind, we find that the validity of interview as data collecting method is strength-
ened, due to the fact that our participants engage in verbal communication within their work 
environment daily. Verbal communication is a tool for them in order to further their own in-
terests and in conducting interviews with them, we "meet them in their own field", so to 
speak. For these interviews, we decided to use the semi-structured, or semi-standardised way 
of structuring the interview. 
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Flick presents the semi-standardised interview as a way to [...] study subjective theories [...] 
and that these refer [...] to the fact that interviewees have a complex stock of knowledge about 
the topic under study. He indicates that the semi-standardised interview is structured by open, 
theory-driven and confrontational questions (Flick, 2009, p. 156-158). We have used this 
structure in our project and find it relevant because influence (as seen in our problem formula-
tion) has subjective tendencies and the various actors have different experiences of these 
situations. Furthermore, this structure is beneficial to our project, as we engage the inter-
viewee in their specific knowledge and subjective experience with open questions, and re-
address some of their relevant claims by confrontational questions (Flick, 2009, p. 157). This 
gives an insight and grounds for comparability between the interviewees' answers. 
We decided to ask our interviewees if it was possible for us to observe any possible on-going 
negotiations or meetings between government and non-government actors, concerning any 
related policy-making, in the chance that we could get access to optimal primary data. We 
find observations particularly interesting because our case has been subject to recent devel-
opment, in the form of the government and interest organisations’ recent reassessment of the 
buffer zone legislation. The interviewees informed us, however, that these meetings were con-
fidential in nature and that we as such would not be allowed to attend. This explicit expres-
sion of black box negotiations will be addressed later in the analysis. 
The interviewees 
Jacob Tilma is the Chief of Media at the agricultural interest organisation Bæredygtig Land-
brug. He has a degree in journalism and started working for Bæredygtig Landbrug in 2011. 
He was interviewed by Josefine Nytofte and Natasja Wexøe Jakobsen on the 3rd of May 
2013, at the office of Bæredygtig Landbrug in Vipperød. 
Niels Peter Nørring is the Director of Environment and Energy in the largest agricultural 
interest organisation in Denmark, Landbrug & Fødevarer. He has a degree in agricultural sci-
ence and he was interviewed by Nikolaj Gedionsen and Nina Kattler on the 3rd of May 2013, 
at the office of Landbrug & Fødevarer in Copenhagen. 
All interviews were conducted and transcribed in Danish, and as such, when it is referenced 
to, it will have been directly translated from Danish to English. 
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Observation 
Despite the fact that we were unable to observe an actual black box negotiation, our approach 
to interview actors within agricultural interest organisations resulted in an invitation to attend 
a political consultation related to our case of buffer zones, which opened up for a new data 
collecting method: observation. The consultation was held at Christiansborg, the seat of the 
Danish Parliament, where the Minister of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries, Mette Gjerskov, 
attended questions presented by members of the political opposition. As researchers, although 
we were present, we were not otherwise active participants in the consultation, whereby you 
could consider the observation overt and our role the 'observer-as-participant'. A disadvantage 
to this method is that any observation may have an influence on the observed, and the ob-
served may behave differently (Flick, 2009. pp. 222-225), but as all public consultations are 
filmed, we believe that our influence on the process was minimal, as the political setting ex-
plicitly allowed for observers. Had we faced a different, more “natural” setting, our presence 
could have had an unwanted impact on the observed. A solution to this could be to have 
filmed the observation and make it covert, though this could pose ethical issues with the ob-
served unaware. We further deemed the academic profit of this approach, the covert observa-
tion, non-existent in our case as the observation would be readily accessible for the public 
regardless on the Danish Parliament's website following the event. One could then argue that 
our presence was unnecessary, yet we found it an advantage to be able to present our final 
data as primary, as we would not ultimately be in control of the video data made public. Addi-
tionally, we could argue that this research method well complements the additional primary 
data of interviews with a new dimension of first hand observations. 
Alternative considerations 
We reflected on using surveys as an alternative to interviews and observations. Surveys would 
give the data collection an anonymity that some of our subjects might want, but we still 
needed to identify who to contact and the method did not seem to be able get as in-depth an-
swers as we would like. We also realised that the assumption that our subjects would want 
anonymity was biased. 
We further assessed the validity of analysing official documents (laws, statistics, official tran-
scripts, etc.) as a primary method, but determined it would be a more comparative study and 
that we, as with surveys, would not get the in-depth answers we seek. We decided to explore 
the official documents concerning the buffer zone-case and use them as secondary empirical 
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data. This offers us decent background knowledge in order to better understand the field of 
study. 
 
Analytical strategy 
Another valid discussion of any research concerns the analytical strategy, which can be di-
vided into either a linear or circular research process. If we choose a circular research process, 
or induction, we will perform our interviews with no theoretical background, and this will 
subsequently lead to the formulation of a theory in accordance with our gathered data. How-
ever, we believe induction should be used carefully, as we think it can be a difficult approach. 
Alternatively, we could use a more linear or deductive approach, which we think is the safer 
option and largely preferred analytical strategy among researchers (Flick, 2009. pp. 90-95). 
Another option could be to adopt a semi-circular research process as presented by professor 
at Roskilde University Dr. Afonso Moreira, where deduction and induction are, in a sense, put 
together. It offers ground for inspiration for our research process as we find a sense of flexi-
bility in this composition of both inductive and deductive tendencies. With this structure, one 
starts with a theory or theories. The further structure of this semi-circular model can be seen 
in figure 2 below. In adopting this structure, we initially did start out with a set of theories 
which set the ground for our research and framed our problem area. We were, through these 
theories, able to form our own hypothesis in the form of a problem formulation. This further 
led us to investigate the relevant background information, which gave us sufficient back-
ground knowledge of the area in order to collect the primary empirical material. This is fol-
lowed by the analysis, which consists of the gathered empirical material which is put in rela-
tion to the theories we started out with. The results will enable us to form conclusions based 
therein. 
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Figure 2: The semi-circular model by Dr. Afonso Moreira. 
 
Limitations 
The optimal scenario would be to be able to observe an actual closed door meeting of a pol-
icy-in-the-making, but we initially surmised that this was improbable to be attained. This pre-
sumption was, as aforementioned in this chapter, later affirmed by the participants’ refusal to 
include us in these closed meetings. This supposition also helped us realise that one of our 
own bias was to consider actors practicing lobbyism as somewhat “shady” characters. This, in 
turn, also made us consider other bias we had, e.g. when we decided to exclude the word 
‘lobbyism’ from our problem formulation because we felt it sounded too biased. After we 
read more theory on the subject of lobbyism and after conducting our interviews, we came to 
view lobbyism as more of a tool for interest organisations than actual actors doing “behind-
the-scenes” work. 
A disadvantage and limitation to our choice of data collecting method, the interviews, is the 
[...] analytical interplay between the researcher and participants (Daly, 2007, p. 210). E.g. 
when we conduct our interviews, the participants will most likely be selective in their por-
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trayal as they attempt to interpret our questions and how to appear in accordance with what is 
beneficial to them. This can be a limitation to our project, since these actors partake in closed 
meetings and interactions with politicians where they attempt to further their own organisa-
tion’s interest. We may not be privy to the full story and thus exposed to the participant's bias. 
We need to be aware of this tendency for the duration of our interview analysis. 
Another aspect to be aware of is, that the project deals with a Danish problem area; hence 
much of the available material will only be in Danish. The majority of the legislative material 
we have gathered is also in Danish. Furthermore, the interviews we have conducted are in 
Danish as well. As such, much of the referenced literature and appendix will be in Danish. 
We have had no problems in finding theoretical literature about our topic, as there are many 
books written about lobbyism, and lobbyism in agriculture. 
Finally, we should determine the relevance of evidence. In examining the closed meetings 
between interest groups and politicians, we cannot begin to generalise on a broader level. In 
presenting evidence and deciding on what evidence is, we look at tendencies within our case 
in question, but this only shows a fraction of a greater picture. The evidence is found in the 
tools of lobbyism, and the consequences they have on official legislation, as it is the perceived 
reality of the participants we explore. 
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Analysis 
In this chapter the five working questions presented in the introduction will be examined and 
discussed. The first is the working question regarding the function of the interest organisation. 
The second deals with lobbyism and democracy. The third working question gives an insight 
to the black boxes. The fourth examines the actors involved in the decision making process in 
the case of the law on buffer zones and studies what general knowledge can be derived from 
this involvement. The fifth, and final, working question deals with the tools used by the inter-
est organisation in order to gain influence on the political actors. These five working ques-
tions will, in the conclusion, be tied together in order to answer our problem formulation. 
 
Purpose, power and influence 
In this section we will answer the first working question: What function do interest organisa-
tions have? This will be done by examining the purpose, power and influence of the interest 
organisation. Furthermore, we will examine how interest organisations exert their political 
activities. Firstly, Nørring and Tilma’s statements will be presented in relation to the corpora-
tist model. Secondly, the empirical material of interviews will be compared to Commons’ 
theory of pressure groups. Finally, the working question will be answered in a summary of 
this sub-chapter.  
According to the theory on organisations, the interest organisations have the purpose of ful-
filling its members’ common interests. In the case of agricultural interest organisations, the 
common interest is better conditions for the farmers. When it is believed that the organisation 
no longer fulfils its purpose, new organisations emerge to e.g. replace the old or go into a dif-
ferent direction. This explains what occurred when Bæredygtig Landbrug came into existence 
in 2010 from within the larger organisation Landbrug & Fødevarer. Head of Landbrug & 
Fødevarer, Niels Peter Nørring is in agreement with this, as he expressed that Bæredygtig 
Landbrug emerged because:  
 [...] there was someone who at a time found that we [red: Landbrug & Fødevarer] were 
 not sufficiently pronounced in our opinions, and not achieving the results believed to be 
 achievable (Appendix 3: Interview with Niels Peter Nørring, p. 1). 
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This is supported by Chief of Media at Bæredygtigt Landbrug, Jacob Tilma, who states that 
[…] the members who founded Bæredygtigt Landbrug believed that there were too many in-
terests in Landbrug & Fødevarer (Appendix 2: Interview with Jacob Tilma, p. 1). 
Having a lot of members in an organisation gives the organisation a financial advantage. With 
more members, more membership fees will be paid, and the organisation will have more capi-
tal to e.g lead bigger lawsuits. However, one could argue that interest organisations can get 
too big and have too many interests to manage. The interests of Landbrug & Fødevarer’s 
members vary greatly, with their members ranging from big players, such as ARLA og Dan-
ish Crown, Tican, to smaller, independent farmers. This can make it hard for Landbrug & 
Fødevarer to meet the interests of all their members. Contrary to Landbrug & Fødevarer, 
Bæredygtigt Landbrug have fewer members, and thereby fewer interests to consider. This 
provides them with less capital for e.g. lawsuits. With less financial capital and fewer mem-
bers, Bæredygtigt Landbrug may not acquire the same influential impact as Landbrug & 
Fødevarer. They may, however, use other means in order to exert their interests, i.e. journal-
ism and PR.  
Like a labour union, the interest organisation’s power and influence stems from membership, 
but also from administrative control and relationship with the relevant ministry. As seen in the 
corporatist model, the relationship between interest organisation and ministry is interdepend-
ent, where both parties serve a function to the other. As Niels Peter Nørring, from Landbrug 
& Fødevarer, puts it:  
 […] political interest management happens on many levels: […] in dialogue 
 with ministers, […] in dialogue with parliamentary politicians, […] within the 
 implementation of regulations of the laws. It is broad; it is in all the different 
 agencies (Appendix 3: Interview with Niels Peter Nørring, p. 2).  
Basically, as Nørring expresses: 
 It takes place in close dialog with parliamentary politicians [and] close dialog 
 with government officials (Appendix 3: Interview with Niels Peter Nørring, p. 
 2).  
This dialog, Nørring stresses, [...] is not negotiations, it is political interest management. It is 
just like everyone else who practices their opportunity to be heard (Appendix 3: Interview 
with Niels Peter Nørring, p. 4). In their dialogs with various people of interest, such as politi-
cians or government officials, the interest organisations aspire to set the agenda. This is done 
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by pitching new ideas, provide new information and offer other solutions to various problems, 
because, as Nørring argues, it is […] incredibly important that you inform the politicians 
properly, because the politicians act only on presentations from the government offices, but 
most often, a case needs to be viewed from many angles (Appendix 3: Interview with Niels 
Peter Nørring, p. 4).  
When the interest organisations are pitching ideas, it often occurs behind closed doors. This, 
Tilma argues, is not meant to keep secrets, but rather a way for the politicians [...] to avoid 
commitment when looking for inspiration (Appendix 2: Interview with Jacob Tilma, pp. 6-7). 
This is backed up by Nørring, who finds that the closed meetings are a sign of confidentiality. 
Because, as he argues:   
 […] we do not walk out and talk. If we are at an audience for a committee, 
 where we are trying to tell the environmental committee, foods committee or a 
 different committee, what our position is regarding something, we do not walk 
 out afterwards and convey what this or that parliamentary politicians said when 
 the audience is over (Appendix 3: Interview with Niels Peter Nørring, p. 5). 
As expressed by John R. Commons’ theory on pressure groups, the interest organisations 
serve as a vital function in a democracy. He finds that pressure groups are useful as they bring 
about results which would otherwise not have been completed by the government. This is 
supported by Nørring, who believes that: 
 [...] we have a great tradition in Denmark [because the] politicians actually are 
 open to listen to many different views and that they subsequently make the deci-
 sions. And then we will do everything we can to be able to render influence 
 (Appendix 3: Interview with Niels Peter Nørring, p. 5) 
As such, John R. Commons, Niels Peter Nørring and Jacob Tilma view the interest organisa-
tions as vital for the democracy. As Nørring states:  
 We [red: the interest organisations] go there to talk to them [red: the politi-
 cians], we go there to give them good ideas, we try to convince them of what is 
 the right thing to decide. Such are the democratic ground rules (Appendix 3: 
 Interview with Niels Peter Nørring, p. 4).  
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Interest organisations serve as insightful experts to the politicians, who, according to Tilma, 
see lobbyists as [...] just someone you use to gain more insight in a matter (Appendix 2: Inter-
view with Jacob Tilma, p. 7). 
A summary of the function of the interest organisation can be done in four steps: 
The first step is to attend to the particular common interest of the group. The second is to in-
crease the amount of memberships in the organisation, where the optimal goal is achieving 
monopoly. The third step is to defend the common interest of the group, not necessarily con-
sidering the interest of the public. The fourth, and last, step is to maximise the flow of re-
sources the organisation receive and in continuation of that, making sure that the resources are 
managed effectively in regards to the interests of the members (Bille, 2004, p. 55). 
As aforementioned, Tilma and Nørring indicate how they, as interest organisations, and the 
government each offer something to the other. Interest organisations are capable of producing 
information, while the government provides the public legislation, which members of the in-
terest organisations in turn must abide by. This symbiotic relationship between interest or-
ganisations and the government is further supported by the corporatist model. While pluralism 
and Commons’ theory of pressure groups claim that interest organisations are vital for democ-
racy, this close, interdependent relationship may offer an opposed view of democracy. We 
will in the next section discuss how lobbyism affects democratic dimensions.  
 
Lobbyism and democracy 
In this section, we answer our fourth working question: How does lobbyism influence our 
views of democracy? We will do this by firstly reflecting upon Buksti’s theory on pluralism 
and Common’s theory on pressure groups, and their relation to democracy within interest 
groups. Secondly, we will connect this with Denmark’s position in the EIU’s Democracy In-
dex. Thirdly, we will oppose these arguments with Heywood’s presentation of the corporatist 
model linking it to the Danish representative democracy model. We will then discuss these 
aspects in relation to our specific case, based on our interviews. Finally, these points will be 
tied together in a preliminary conclusion. 
At a glance, lobbyism from interest organisations seems like a “logical” step in a democracy. 
The interest organisations are a concentrated source of both information for the politicians 
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and a mouthpiece for the population represented. Especially in Denmark, with the tradition of 
representative democracy, the fact that the agricultural sector has collected their embodiment 
in small personified delegations speaks of a custom where it falls natural to elect a few to 
speak for the many. If you take Heywood's pluralist model into consideration, based on Buk-
sti’s theory of Pluralism, it shows us that not only is lobbyism, conducted on the behalf of 
interest organisations, a promotion of democracy but also something to be praised as it is the 
ultimate sign of a representative democratic process. John R. Commons' theory on pressure 
groups also supports this view with the emphasis on these groups being the very lifeblood of 
democracy. 
Denmark's place among the top of EIU’s Democracy Index Report, as mentioned in the sec-
tion on Measuring Democracy, is also a strong indicator of how lobbyism from interest or-
ganisations is a sign of a strong democratic process. The fact that the tradition for including 
interest organisation's input has been an integrated part of Danish legislative process for a 
long time, can, together with Buksti's and Commons' theories, arguably be one of the explana-
tions for this high place in the Democracy Index. 
Additionally, if we consider Heywood's corporatist model, the evidence of how the interest 
organisations work in Denmark is strengthened, with the exception that there are no indication 
of the leaders of the two agricultural interest organisations (Landbrug & Fødevarer and Bære-
dygtigt Landbrug) not being directly accountable to their members. Yet, when the corporatist 
model also suggests that the [...] bargaining between the government and the interest organi-
sations is in no way subject to public scrutiny (Heywood, 2007. p. 300), lobbyism can be seen 
in a different light. 
While Jacob Tilma from Bæredygtigt Landbrug and Niels Peter Nørring from Landbrug & 
Fødevarer both confirm that a lot of interaction between the agricultural interest organisations 
and the politicians is undocumented and/or happens in a closed forum, they insist it is for the 
benefit of the politicians (Appendix 2: Interview with Jacob Tilma, p. 2 and Appendix 3: In-
terview with Niels Peter Nørring, p. 5). These closed forums, or meetings behind closed 
doors, raise the question of transparency in the Danish legislative process. Arguably, the 
closed meetings also leave out the general population who, according to the definition of de-
mocracy, are the ones who rule. One the other hand, the whole idea of representative democ-
racy leaves the decision makings in the hands of a select few, yet, this lack of transparency 
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gives the impression that the select few has something to hide. This, in turn, gives the use of 
lobbyism as a tool, a touch of something sinister. 
According to the “By-Product” theory by Olsen, the success of large and thriving interest or-
ganisations does not stem from the lobbyism conducted, but rather from other activities. If 
this theory is true, an organisation like Landbrug & Fødevarer only use lobbyism as a tool, 
and not as the goal itself. This is in agreement with what was expressed by our interview with 
Niels Peter Nørring:  
 A lot of those that are employed by Landbrug & Fødevarer are doing research 
 and development of agriculture, development-assignments and so on […]. But 
 the political aspect, which the companies pay for, and the farmers pay for, is 
 relatively small actually (Appendix 3: Interview with Niels Peter Nørring, p. 4). 
Furthermore, Olsen also argues that the rational self-interested individual will not strive for a 
common good and needs some sort of benefit – a claim that can explain the agricultural inter-
est organisations lobbying success. The organisations, because of their size and resources, can 
simply afford to hire the best lobbyists to represent them, as Niels Peter Nørring expresses it:  
 It is direct dues from our farmers and direct dues from our companies which 
 pay for what political interest management we do. And we are so large because 
 there are a lot of things which are of concern for the farmer and for the compa-
 nies, legislatively (Appendix 3: Interview with Niels Peter Nørring, p. 4). 
This picture, together with Heywood's corporatist model, shows lobbyism as a tool of indirect 
influence on the legislative process proportional with the available resources of the patrons of 
the interest organisations. Resources that can also be used as contributions to political parties. 
This possibility was not discussed with either Jacob Tilma or Niels Peter Nørring, nor have 
we found any mention of it on the organisation's websites, yet it is a possibility that is hard to 
ignore. Given the fact that the amounts contributed to political parties need not be disclosed 
(Appendix 6: Law on private contributions to political parties, p. 2), present another lack of 
transparency. 
This view suggests that if you are a strong and resourceful organisations, you have the oppor-
tunity to buy better conditions for your interests – a view which conflict the democratic 
standpoints. We may also consider that not every individual is capable of organising them-
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selves as the larger, financially stable interest organisations can, which further questions the 
democratic conditions for the single citizen. 
In the end we can roughly set the understanding of lobbyism up into two parts: 
1. Lobbyism, as the action of interest organisations with in-depth knowledge of their 
field, informing decision-making government officials and leaving the politicians to 
pass the legislations as they see fit, is a celebrated sign of the Danish democracy.  
2. Lobbyism, as the tool which is used in “back-alley negotiations”, with the goal of 
squeezing every resource possible out of the deal, without regards to the welfare of 
others. In this case it is possible to get the best representation money can buy and is 
therefore the ultimate worst-case scenario you call forth when there are instances such 
as the black box dialogues in play. 
From this we conclude that the option of doing lobbying work is great tool for interest organi-
sations, and as with any tool, it can be used for good or for ill – which is a matter of opinion. 
But when there are dialogues between the government and a third party that can lead to some-
thing as important as legislations, which is not disclosed to the public, questions arise. When 
you consider the case of the buffer zone - a legislation made to take protect the environment, 
as strictly pointed out by the Minister of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries (Appendix 4: Notes 
from Consultation, p. 2) – any argument against it can be construed as self-serving, especially 
when coming from the industry that the law affects. 
So, for the common citizen in a representative democracy, the black boxes make lobbyism 
seem like an intangible way for interest organisations to gain influence on policy-making. 
While from the point of view of large industry sectors, such as the agricultural sector in Den-
mark, lobbyism is an informal tool to disclose their knowledge and position on different mat-
ters to the right instances – a tool which is their democratic right. 
 
A glimpse inside the black box 
In this section, we will discuss and answer our third working question: How can we gain 
knowledge to what goes on in the black box in the legislation process? Firstly, we will pull 
out key notions from the methods chapter, which support the question. Secondly, we will look 
Page 48 of 70 
 
into the Danish legislative process based on two actors within the Danish agricultural interest 
organisation communities. We will then put this into perspective using the concept of the 
black box and look into the various aspects of the Danish legislative process, discussing when 
and where these black boxes might occur. These will be illustrated with models we con-
structed.  
As previously stated in the Methods chapter, it would have been optimal to personally attend 
a closed meeting between interest organisation's representatives and the government. In doing 
this, it would have been possible to observe first-hand what exactly goes on behind the closed 
doors. However, this option was found unlikely and later confirmed to not be possible. We 
found, then, that a decent alternative could be to conduct interviews with relevant actors. We 
did so with two prominent characters within their respective agricultural interest organisation, 
Jacob Tilma from Bæredygtigt Landbrug and Niels Peter Nørring from Landbrug & 
Fødevarer. We asked both actors if it was possible to observe the closed meeting, which they 
both denied. Instead they were able to explain how they conduct their work, particularly in 
relation to the legislative process. 
When asking Tilma just how they partake in the legislative process, he reveals that they [...] 
investigate the situation carefully [...] prior to initiating contact with parliamentary politicians. 
He furthermore explains that he finds them [...] easy to get into a conversation if you have a 
decent case (Appendix 2: Interview with Jacob Tilma, p. 3). Nørring supports this statement, 
but adds that the current government is more inclined to the advice of interest organisations as 
opposed to the previous Liberal-Conservative government, as the previous government did 
not invite the interest organisations to join the debate prior to adopting the buffer zone law 
(Appendix 3: Interview with Niels Peter Nørring, p. 2). He indicates that in relation to the 
preparatory policy work, Landbrug & Fødevarer [...] try to affect the process as early as pos-
sible (Appendix 3: Interview with Niels Peter Nørring, p. 2). 
Nørring and Tilma both reveal that they do not make public what they have talked about with 
politicians due to confidentiality. Tilma explains that [meetings] behind closed doors is sim-
ply lobbyism [...] and, further, that it is [...] people inviting other people to express that you 
would like to be more enlightened and that you would like to see the case from more sides 
than you have previously. These meetings occurring behind closed doors are [...] to make sure 
that the politicians avoid commitment when looking for inspiration (Appendix 2: Interview 
with Jacob Tilma, pp. 6-7). Nørring and Tilma also both agree that their own agendas are in 
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no way hidden, as can be seen in various media. It is completely clear what we believe when 
we write a reader's letter, a chronicle [or] if we are interviewed for a newspaper [...] (Appen-
dix 3: Interview with Niels Peter Nørring, p. 5). 
While we cannot access the actual black box of policy making, there are two things we can 
look at, directly related to these hidden conversations: what goes into the black box (the in-
put), and what comes out (the output). The inputs are the things that initially influence the 
policy making. Interest organisations make no habit of hiding their agenda to the public - on 
the contrary. According to Tilma, they attempt to get their stories out to those with [...] a 
greater interface with the population than what [they] have [themselves] (Appendix 2: Inter-
view with Jacob Tilma, p. 7). Nørring indicates that they do not conduct negotiations within 
the black boxes per se:  
 We [red: the Interest Organisations] do not go there to negotiate with them [red: 
 the politicians]. We go there to talk to them, we give them good ideas, we try to 
 convince them of what is the right thing to decide. Such are the democratic 
 ground rules (Appendix 3: Interview with Niels Peter Nørring, p. 4). 
 
 
Figure 3: Simple black box model 
Now we have a decent understanding of what goes into the black box - through official me-
dias and first hand material such as interviews. The second step is to look at the output. In 
policy making, we see the output as the actual policies that emerge or the public notifications 
in relation to the legislation processes. In combining the two, with an educated understanding 
of the agendas related to the respective parties involved in the black box, we can begin to 
make educated guesses as to who pressed for changes in which way and whether or not these 
requests were met in the output. 
One thing is certain: the legislative process is a lengthy one, as previously noted in the theory 
chapter relating to the Danish legislation. According to figure 1, there are concurrent formal 
and informal processes. When ministry officials in the legislative phase conduct a draft of a 
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policy, they have the option of consulting the relevant interest organisations. The figure 1 of 
this perceived reality furthermore suggests that this is a one-way contact - with the arrow 
leading from the formal phase to the informal. According to Tilma, they often initiate contact 
with opposition parties and other members of parliamentary. Paragraph 20-questions are 
questions that members of parliament can ask the minister [...] and explains that [...] many 
interest organisations contact members of parliament and ask if they would care to ask the 
minister this or that question (Appendix 2: Interview with Jacob Tilma, p. 3). In this regard, 
you could argue that the government's consultation with the interest organisations is not in 
fact a one-way dimension. 
  
Figure 4: Revised legislative process model 
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Figure 4 shows a complex version of figure 1 seen previously in this project. The actors are 
the same, yet the arrows indicate a much more complex process where political officials and 
interest organisations gain influence in many aspects and phases of the legislative process. 
Figure 1 only indicated a one-way communication between ministry officials and interest or-
ganisations. Our proposal of what actually occurs in the legislative processes can be seen in 
figure 4, as is based on our interviews and observations, and indicates that interest organisa-
tion and political officials in turn initiate contact with ministry officials during the legislation 
phase. The figure further shows that political officials have an influence on the committee 
processes, as seen in the hearing as well as Tilma's account of the paragraph 20 questions. 
An example of a possible black box incident can be brought out from our case of buffer 
zones. Initially, the buffer zone law was taken into effect by the previous Liberal-
Conservative government due to environmental considerations based on EU's Water Frame-
work Directive. It was later modified and made stricter by the current government for the 
same reason: the environment. Their incentive was, and is, to support EU's Water Framework 
Directive and protect the environment by introducing laws that they believe will reduce the 
amount of pesticides and chemicals, originating from the agricultural sector, in the water. 
However, the focus inevitably changed as per the Political Consultation on the 8th of May 
2013 concerning the water plans. Parliamentary politicians, who are members of the commit-
tee of Foods, Agriculture and Fisheries, were questioning the Minister of Food, Agriculture 
and Fisheries, Mette Gjerskov. The meeting was, in its essence, concerned with the issues 
relating to the compensation offered to farmers in relation to buffer zones (Appendix 4: Notes 
from consultation, p. 1). Part of the planned compensation was supposed to be financed by the 
EU, but due to the fact that the Water Plans were denied by the EU Commission, the financial 
aid from EU is no longer available (Appendix 4: Notes from consultation, p. 2). As such, it 
would seem that the compensation to the farmers was suddenly jeopardised. 
 
Figure 5: Input model 
 
With a strong sense of argument, we can assume that the issue of the financial repercussions 
was raised by the individuals it was likely to affect. In this case, the farmers, whose arable 
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lands were scheduled to be cut down, followed a potential lack of financial compensation. 
The natural step for the farmers is to take their case to those who act as their voice: the inter-
est organisations. We may consider this as the input, as shown in the above figure 5.  
 
Figure 6: Input - Output model 
Next, we have the consultation. Opposing parties were questioning the Minister's solution in 
relation to the lack of compensations. The farmers’ problems became a clear agenda. The 
Minister assured that farmers would receive their compensation in the form of a government 
financial aid, save a handful of the largest corporations, due to a specific loft of financial sup-
port the government can give a company called the De Minimis rule (Appendix 4: Notes from 
consultation, p. 1). The EU compensation was as such replaced with a government financial 
aid, thus successfully answering the farmers' initial plea. We can consider this the output, as 
illustrated in the above figure 6.  
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Figure 7: Complex black box model 
At first, as figures 3 and 7 illustrate, the black box seems non-transparent. How can we know 
what happened in between? The likely step following the farmers' concerns could have been 
for the interest organisation to take the matter further up the ladder to a politician with strong 
pull. In relation to the consultation on the 8th of May, Tilma explains that [all] of the [politi-
cal] opposition has been interested in this case and that Bæredygtigt Landbrug has [...] pre-
sented documentation for the opposition which they [the opposition] found sufficiently inter-
esting to invite the Minister to the consultation (Appendix 2: Interview with Jacob Tilma, p. 
3). 
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Figure 8: Complex transparent black box model 
Based on the initial input, the farmers' concerns and the interest organisations’ protecting the 
interests of their members, and the following output - the reaction by the opposing parties 
calling the Minister to a consultation, the black box becomes more transparent as seen in the 
above figure 8. Interest organisations present documentation and information to unknown 
politicians. The material presented must have been sufficiently persuasive to the politicians, 
due to how the case became an issue. 
Finally, it should be noted that the processes of the black box is a complex matter. Yet, 
through sufficient investigation, the researcher may be able to interpret the framework of what 
occurs behind closed doors. Regarding this project, it has been a combination of subject back-
ground research of interests, interviews with lobbying actors and observing a consultation. In 
this sense, we find that we have, in fact, obtained knowledge of a black box in the legislative 
process. 
 
Involvement within policy-making 
In this section we will discuss and answer working question four: What actors and institu-
tions are involved in the policy-making process of the buffer zones in Denmark, and 
what general knowledge can we gain from their involvement? In order to do this, we will 
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take a look at the different actors involved and the nature of their involvement. Lastly, we will 
use Friedmann’s planning theory to explain actions and reactions.  
Originally, the Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries along with the Ministry of Envi-
ronment worked out the buffer zone law as a consequence of the Green Growth package, a 
plan on how to meet standards of EU’s Water Framework Directive from 2000, worked out 
by the previous, liberal-conservative government in 2009, as a part of the Water Plans. 
Aforementioned figure 1: The Danish Legislative Process shows how, traditionally, interest 
organisations are included in the legislative process. As Niels Peter Nørring puts it:  
 We are in dialog with them [red: the politicians] when things are discussed in 
 the Danish Parliament and the government (Appendix 3: Interview with Niels 
 Peter Nørring, p. 2).  
However, with this particular law of the buffer zones, the agricultural interest organisations 
and by extension farmers, were excluded from the hearings and had no say. This displeased 
agricultural interest organisations and subsequently they have pushed to have the Water Plans 
declared invalid. As mentioned earlier in the chapter, some of the members of Landbrug & 
Fødevarer felt that not enough action was taken by their organisation, so they formed the or-
ganisation Bæredygtigt Landbrug. Jacob Tilma explains:   
 Bæredygtigt Landbrug was formed in 2010 as a protest-organisation, because 
 some thought Landbrug & Fødevarer did not do their political job well enough. […] 
 Landbrug & Fødevarer tend to seek dialog whereas we [Red: Bæredygtigt Landbrug] 
 bite the hamstrings a little and put pressure on them. (Appendix 2: Interview with 
 Jacob Tilma, p. 1 and 5).  
As seen in the chapter on the process of the Water Plans, the Water Plans were declared inva-
lid, due to the fact that the supplementary hearing regarding the Water Plans on the 03-
10.12.2011 was too short. The next step on the agenda for the agricultural interest organisa-
tions were the buffer zone law. They use the tools available, such as PR and journalism, in 
order to gain interest and attention from both politicians and the public. Then they used lobby-
ism in closed meetings to enlighten politicians of the government opposition on the matter, in 
order to gain influence on the decision making of the buffer zones. Ultimately, interest or-
ganisations, politicians in the government and of the opposition alike all have influence on the 
buffer zones in each their own way.  
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Using aforementioned planning theory by Friedmann, we can gain knowledge on why the 
previous government chose to leave out the organisations during negotiations. According to 
the theory, the Danish government is faced with a problem from EU in form of the Water 
Framework Directive. The problem is of the ”wicked” kind due to the fact that it is a social 
issue, which poses great trickiness regarding solutions. As Friedmann says: [...] social prob-
lems are never solved; they are merely displaced by other problems (Friedmann, 1987, p. 
167). This means that regardless of what solution is found, new issues will just arise. The 
Green Growth package, which features the Water Plans and, by extension, the buffer zone 
law, was an attempt to solve the EU Water Framework Directive’s “wicked” problem. Now 
that they have attempted to solve the problem of living up to the standards of EU’s Water 
Framework Directive with the buffer zones, the initial problem has been replaced by other 
issues. An example of the problem moving around could be that the agricultural sector in 
Denmark might experience a loss of international competitiveness, which will ultimately have 
negative effects on the Danish economy. 
By excluding interest organisations from the legislative process of the Green Growth package, 
politicians might have left out individuals, who possess the proper knowledge and are special-
ised within their field. Jacob Tilma states:  
 It is just a “desk-way” of doing things. They forget to go out and see what the actual 
 conditions are like. The farmers want them to come out and do tests of the water
 courses. "What are the conditions"? Rather that do a “desk-calculation” of "This is 
 how it must be, this is how it will be." (Appendix 2: Interview with Jacob Tilma, p. 6).  
Friedmann talks about this in his theory on “the veil of time”, which discusses the desire to 
forecast future occurrences. He argues that this tradition of forecasting is improbable to hold 
much merit as actual and certain predictions, although the forecasting can be useful as a tool 
in various situations (Friedmann, 1987, pp. 168-170), as elaborated in the theory chapter. In-
stead of doing a “desk-calculation” or models of the situation, politicians could have included 
interest organisations in the hearings, and used their expert knowledge of the field when find-
ing a solution to the problem. However, there is always the risk that this expert knowledge is 
coming from a biased person. As Friedmann states, the effectiveness of an analyst depends on 
their [...] knowledge of the historical and institutional context for decision (Friedmann, 1987, 
p. 143). A representative of an interest organisation cannot be described as completely objec-
tive in the matter, and the possibility of a conflict of interests could be viewed as highly 
likely. This could lead to distrust in the representative, where his/her expert knowledge is put 
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up against a possible ulterior motive, which might be why the politicians chose to exclude the 
interest organisations. Furthermore, they may not possess the general analytical skills which, 
as expressed by Friedmann, are needed in the policy analysis process. However, the alterna-
tive when analysts, of no relation to the case, assume full responsibility for the making of a 
policy, it becomes problematic that they do not have the needed background knowledge. It 
becomes a double-edged blade where you require knowledge of the case in question, but at 
the same time objectivity is necessary.   
 
Tools of the Trade  
In this section, we will answer our fifth working question: What tools do the agricultural 
interest organisations use to gain influence on the political actors? Firstly, we will account 
for the tools the agricultural interest organisations use when influencing a policy, with refer-
ences to our interviews. Secondly, we will link the tools to Rothenborg’s model. Thirdly, we 
will give a brief reflection on the possibility of political party contribution. Lastly, we will 
conclude with a small reflection. 
The basic function of an interest organisation is to represent a portion of the population, and 
therefore it is a given, that the larger number of members an organisation has, the larger the 
influence in a democracy, as established by Heywood (2007, p. 298). If you yield a great eco-
nomic authority on top of a large number of members, it is likely that your influence has a 
larger impact. 
As explained earlier, the size of the agricultural sector in Denmark has dwindled since the 
1950's, but its tradition of influence and political know-how has moved with the times. As 
Jacob Tilma from Bæredygtigt Landbrug confirms, it is customary within their interest or-
ganisation to employ journalists and legal counsellors in their public relations department 
(Appendix 2: Interview with Jacob Tilma, p. 2). One could then argue that this behaviour 
would be similar within the interest organisations of the remaining agricultural sector. Com-
bined with the agricultural sector's employment of their own researchers, as Niels Peter Nør-
ring from Landbrug & Fødevarer explains (Appendix 3: Interview with Niels Peter Nørring, 
p. 4), they are able to present strong cases for the politicians. These cases can be used to both 
backup claims or deny them, and as the agricultural organisations are not officially tied to any 
specific party, they are in a position to present the cases to the political actors most beneficial 
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to their case, which Jacob Tilma substantiates in his interview (Appendix 2: Interview with 
Jacob Tilma, p. 8). 
By employing their own researchers, the agricultural organisations are also able to create a 
self-manifested credibility for themselves and consequently are more likely to be taken into 
council, e.g. when new agricultural legislations are being discussed. Additionally, the enlist-
ment of legal counsellors gives them the ability to navigate in the legislative processes, and 
their utilisation of journalists arguably grants them the capability to better use the media to 
their advantage. Because, as Tilma explains; 
 [...] if we have a story that we think is really good, we contact Jyllandsposten or 
 Politiken [red: two major Danish newspapers] or someone we find could get it out to a 
 broader platform [...] than our own (Appendix 2: Interview with Jacob Tilma,, p. 7). 
Rothenborg's argumentation model shows the line of reasoning for rejecting more strict envi-
ronmental restrictions and paints a picture of how the agricultural interest organisations tactics 
are formed. A line of reasoning that can be seen when Niels Peter Nørring says, that those 
affected by the buffer zone law need compensation, also on how the opposition focused their 
questions on securing compensation for the agricultural sector to the Minister, in the consulta-
tion on the 8th of May (Appendix 4: Notes from consultation, p. 1), despite how the very rea-
son for implementing this law comes from the pollution created by the agricultural sector. 
This, in turn, can be traced back to the 2nd point of Rothenborg’s argumentation model - if 
there is a problem, it is not our fault. This shows how the agricultural sector has established a 
sound configuration for a line of reasoning, where they will likely gain something to their 
own advantage no matter what the politicians decide. 
So, when Niels Peter Nørring says that the way they influence the policy-making processes is 
with dialogue (Appendix 3: Interview with Niels Peter Nørring, p. 2) he is not wrong, but it is 
the weight behind the arguments and the diverse way of presenting these that makes the dif-
ference - whether it is facts from a case or a way to interpret a law, as attested by Jacob Tilma 
(Appendix 2: Interview with Jacob Tilma, p. 4). Adding the possibility of choosing which 
cases to present to whom, combined with a long-standing custom of being heard, the tools of 
the agricultural interest organisations become many-faceted. 
On top of all these ways of getting their views across, there is also the possibility of political 
party contributions (Appendix 6: Law on private contributions to political parties, p. 2) as 
Page 59 of 70 
 
discussed earlier in the analysis. This option, as stated, is not an issue we have found any tan-
gible evidence on ourselves, but an option that cannot be ignored. A political party contribu-
tion can be an official way of declaring a political standpoint, but if you exercise the right to 
withhold the amount contributed (Appendix 6: Law on private contributions to political par-
ties, p. 2) then, much like the meetings behind closed doors, this lack of transparency can be 
interpreted as an inauspicious act. 
From this, we conclude that the agricultural interest organisations have many tools at their 
disposal, each with many different applications and varying degrees of transparency. To oper-
ate a lot of these tools though, you need a high level of knowledge of especially the legislative 
process and the media. Knowledge the agricultural sector has a great understanding of using 
for example when employing professionals to research, represent and argue on their behalf. 
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Conclusion 
In the following conclusion we will combine the five conclusions of the working questions 
made in the previous chapter, and pull the strands together into an answer to our problem 
formulation. 
1. What function do interest organisations have? 
The function of an interest organisation is primarily to manage the specific interests of their 
members, which does not necessarily coincide with the interests of the general public. In or-
der for the interest organisation to function, they need to increase amount of memberships to 
obtain enough financial capital through membership fees. Finally, the function of an interest 
organisation is to achieve efficient merit of expertise in order to sufficiently exert their politi-
cal influence.  
2. How does lobbyism influence our views of democracy? 
Lobbyism’s influence on our views of democracy depends entirely on the point of view. For 
the common citizen with limited opportunity to organise him- or herself in a larger organisa-
tion, the black boxes of the legislation processes, in which lobbyism occurs, seem unreachable 
and intangible. This view of lobbyism appears undemocratic in nature. However, to the indi-
vidual member of the interest organisations - and the leaders of the interest organisations as 
well - lobbyism is a way of being heard and a commonly used tool in this regard. It further-
more offers specialised information to the politicians and analysts in charge of conducting the 
policy in question. From this perspective, lobbyism seems like an important aspect to the de-
mocratic dimension. 
3. How can we gain knowledge to what goes on in the closed meetings in the 
legislation process? 
Due to the confidential nature of the closed meetings of the legislation processes, it was not 
possible for us to gain access to the black box. The only variables we can consider are the 
input and the output of the black box. If the researcher has sufficient background knowledge 
of the subject at hand, he or she can be able investigate the conditions not available for public 
scrutiny, by analysing the input and the output. This may further include the researcher’s in-
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teraction with the actors involved in these legislation processes - interactions such as inter-
views and observations.  
4. What actors and institutions are involved in the decision making process of 
buffer zones in Denmark, and what general knowledge can we gain from their 
involvement? 
Typically, political actors, interest organisations, ministries and other interested parties are 
involved in the decision making processes. However, in the specific case of the buffer zone 
law in Denmark, the government chose to exclude interest organisations from the initial nego-
tiation stages instead of employing their specialised insight and expert knowledge. With the 
advancement of the case, the interest organisations used lobbying tools to include themselves 
in the legislation process. From this, we can derive in general terms that political actors set 
their own agenda and include the knowledge derived from interest organisations if they find it 
beneficial to their cause.  
5. What tools do the agricultural interest organisations use to gain influence on 
the political actors? 
Interest organisations utilise many different tools in their pursuit to gain influence on political 
actors. They take part in dialogues with related politicians, dialogues which may be either 
closed or open for public scrutiny. Furthermore, the interest organisations use journalism and 
implore PR in other media in order to raise awareness of their interests. In addition, the inter-
est organisations employ specialised professionals with expert knowledge relating to the in-
terest organisations’ area of interest. Thus maximising their credibility to political actors, as 
well as the public population, when they engage in legislative processes.  
Problem formulation: 
How do agricultural interest organisations seek to influence the policy-making 
process in regards to the case of buffer zones in Denmark, and what general 
knowledge can we gain from policy-making relating to this case? 
When agricultural interest organisations seek to influence the policy-making processes in re-
lation to the buffer zones in Denmark, they act in their members’ interest in order to further 
their own case. In order to do this, they utilise various tools, where lobbyism is an important 
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aspect. As seen in the case of buffer zones, the interest organisations regularly offer ideas and 
inspiration to political actors. The interest organisations can offer these ideas and inspiration 
to the political actors specifically in accordance with what they anticipate to be the most bene-
ficial to their interests. In the buffer zone legislation, the interest organisations have primarily 
had interactions with politicians in the opposition parties to the current government. Ironi-
cally, the same parties that originally implemented the law without consulting the interest 
organisations. These are interactions based on a mutual, interdependent relationship between 
the interest organisations representatives and the political actors: The interest organisations 
offer the politicians expert knowledge based on the researchers and professionals they em-
ploy. In return, the political actors proceed in the system with this information, in bringing it 
to relevant ministries for perusal and debate. This tendency is seen clearly in the case of 
buffer zones, where political opposition called the decisions of Minister of Foods, Agriculture 
and Fisheries into consultation. However, as these problems are being attended to and at-
tempted solved, they become displaced. Other problems arise in its place which affirms the 
theory that legislation processes address issues that are social scientific in nature and are, as 
such, “wicked” in nature. Despite the interest organisations’ aspirations to solve the problem 
of their trade themselves, the problem is only moved around and may, in turn, affect other 
aspects of society. For example, the competitiveness of the Danish agricultural sector, and by 
extension the entire Danish economy, will be damaged if the buffer zone law is implemented, 
according to the statements we have gathered in our empirical study. However, one might 
consider what the consequences for the environment might be, if the buffer zone law is not 
implemented.  
The problems may, in essence, affect the individual who does in fact not possess the resources 
to organise him- or herself as interest organisations are capable of. Furthermore, the individ-
ual usually does not have the resources to employ researchers and experts, nor do they neces-
sarily have the available network to attend the black box of the legislation processes. The in-
dividual is therefore unable to support and/or object to the information presented in closed 
meetings between interest organisations and politicians. Due to this dimension, the individual 
is not capable of exerting his or her interests as well as the greater interest organisation can, if 
they desire to push something through the legislative system. In this sense, we find that the 
democratic dimension of the work of interest organisations is questionable. Furthermore, the 
nature of the policy-making process should undergo revision in order to address the need for a 
legislative system more in favour of the individual’s right to address his or her democratic 
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rights. But as stated earlier, Denmark is a representative democracy and therefore the idea of 
the few representing the many, is actually the core of the Danish democracy. 
In conclusion, by exercising their constitutional right to organise and their democratic right to 
express their opinions to the elected officials, the interest organisations influence the policy-
making process in Denmark all in accordance with the law. However, by examining the case 
of the buffer zone law, we have discovered what can be argued as undemocratic aspects of the 
legislative process in Denmark. 
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Perspective 
In this chapter, firstly, we will contemplate what problems arise from the conclusion 
drawn/made in our project. Secondly, we will discuss what we possibly could have done dif-
ferently in the project, looking at several diverse approaches.  
We have established that there are problems of transparency in the Danish legislative process 
and this lack can make the common man doubt aspects of the seemingly democratic process-
es. One can argue that something which is supposed to be one of the base pillars of our de-
mocracy - the making of our laws - can be shaken by external organisations. Granted, the or-
ganisations in this context are large and have had influence over a long period of time, but 
should that automatically allow them if they posses this opportunity? On the other hand the 
laws are, in theory, made for the betterment of society and the interest organisations represent 
parts of society. Also, if they are just “playing by the rules” of the legislative process, they 
should be able to use all the tools at their disposal.  
A solution to the transparency problem, which could possibly shed more light to the black 
boxes, is to demand records of every meeting held in the Danish parliament. This solution 
would probably be met with disagreement from both the interest organisation and the politi-
cians, and would be very difficult to enforce - not to mention it would increase the bureaucra-
cy and thus actually lessening transparency further. 
If we had had more time and resources, we would have interviewed government officials who 
are currently involved in the buffer zone case. Then we could possibly have had more aspects 
shedding light on the black boxes. Furthermore, we could have contacted representatives of 
the previous Liberal-Conservative government, and further investigate the reasoning behind 
the unusual process of the creation of the buffer zone law. 
Early in the process of writing the project we decided not to spend time on possible connec-
tions between relevant political actors. We decided not to do so in order to confine our area of 
interest, thus making the project more manageable. What we could have done, had we chosen 
to focus on aforementioned connections, was to interview members of different Danish politi-
cal parties, e.g. the agricultural spokesmen. In these interviews we would have enquired about 
their personal and political relation to agriculture, and subsequently the process of the buffer 
zones. From what we know, without having investigated this further, we would expect to find 
that political parties, originally tied to the Danish agricultural sector such as the Left, Liberal 
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Party, now has been replaced by the more radically nationalist political party, the Danish Peo-
ple’s Party (in Danish: Dansk Folkeparti). 
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